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Offshore oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) is an old business;
the first offshore well began operating off the coast of California in 1896.1 
Since this time, however, technological advances have shaped offshore 
E&P into an entirely different beast.  Gone are the days of wooden decks in
shallow waters.  Today’s deepwater rigs are capable of extracting oil and
gas from thousands of feet below the surface2 and can cost between $600
and $650 million to construct.3  Modern seismic technology allows E&P 
companies to discover swaths of previously untouched reserves in waters
surrounding the continental United States.  No area has been impacted by
this more than the Gulf of Mexico, which boasts thousands of offshore
wells—collectively providing around seventeen percent of the total crude
oil and five percent of the total natural gas produced in the United States.4 
Seismic data in the Gulf of Mexico lies at the heart of the July 2016 Tax 
Court opinion CGG Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, in which the court
analyzed the appropriate tax treatment of seismic data acquisition and
processing activities undertaken by Compagnie Générale de Géophysique 
Americas (CGGA).5  CGGA conducted marine seismic surveys for the
purpose of “detect[ing] or suggest[ing]” the presence of oil and gas, thereafter 
nonexclusively licensing the data gathered through these surveys to customers 
“engaged in oil and gas exploration and development.”6  In its opinion, 
1. Offshore Petroleum History, AM. OIL & GAS HIST. SOC’Y, http://aoghs.org/
offshore-history/offshore-oil-history/ [https://perma.cc/5EDK-Z6BD] (last visited Feb.
21, 2017) (“In 1896, as enterprising businessmen pursued California’s prolific Summerland 
oilfield all the way to the beach, the lure of offshore production enticed Henry L. Williams 
and his associates to build a pier 300 feet out into the Pacific . . . .”). 
2. Elisabeth Fischer, Deepwater: The Gulf of Mexico’s Deepest Offshore Oil and
Gas Rigs, OFFSHORE TECH. (July 4, 2012), http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/ 
featuregulf-mexico-deepest-offshore-oil-gas-rigs/ [https://perma.cc/L5U9-XT9T]. The 
Perdido rig in the Gulf of Mexico is the deepest floating rig in the world, extracting from
an oil and natural gas field approximately 8,000 feet beneath the surface.  David Russell 
Schilling, World’s Largest Offshore Oil Platform an Engineering Masterpiece, INDUSTRY
TAP (June 9, 2014), http://www.industrytap.com/worlds-largest-offshore-oil-platform­
engineering-masterpiece/20699 [https://perma.cc/22CS-J2NQ].
3. Bloomberg News, Maersk Drilling Will Spend as Much as $6 Billion on Oil Rig
Orders, SAN DIEGO SOURCE (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?
SourceCode=20120318fb#.WKVAyHhK9cJ [https://perma.cc/ARZ7-ZPJ3]. 
4. Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
special/gulf_of_mexico/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/SMY8-Z8JQ] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017);
see also BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., COMBINED LEASING REPORT (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.boem.gov/Combined-Leasing-Reports-2016/ [https://perma.cc/MC2T-AHPJ]
(providing that the BOEM currently manages 3,762 active leases, 883 of which are producing
(that is, have produced product such as oil or gas)). 
5.  147 T.C. No. 2, at 4631 (July 21, 2016). 
6. Id. at 4631–32. 
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the court determined that CGGA’s expenses associated with its acquisition 
and processing of seismic data from the outer continental shelf in the Gulf
of Mexico fell within the bounds of “geological and geophysical expenses”
(G&G expenses) as defined in Section 167(h)(1).7  Under Section 167(h)(1), 
“[a]ny geological and geophysical expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United
States . . . shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the 24-month period
beginning on the date that such expense was paid or incurred.”8  To make use
of this remarkably short timeframe for the amortization of capitalizable costs,
CGGA persuaded the court that its activities produced G&G expenses, 
thereby shifting a substantial portion of its tax liability into the future.9 
The question for the court related not to what counts as a G&G expense, 
but rather to who qualifies for the deduction.  The statute provides,
“Geological and geophysical exploration expenditures are [those costs
incurred] for the purpose of obtaining and accumulating data that will
serve as a basis for acquisition or retention of properties.”10  If CGGA 
conducted surveys to acquire and process seismic data for the purpose of 
detecting the presence of oil and gas, does it not necessarily follow that
CGGA’s data serves to inform determinations regarding acquisition or 
retention of properties?  Certainly. The crux of the issue, however, lies in 
who is making the determinations to acquire or retain property.
Traditionally, G&G expenses have been associated with entities holding 
ownership or leasehold rights in the underlying properties subject to
exploration.11  CGGA, having no such rights, was assessed a deficiency
on these very grounds; the IRS reasoned that because CGGA did not have— 
or intend to have—ownership or leasehold rights in any of the properties
it surveyed, it could not make use of Section 167(h)(1) to shorten the timeframe 
7. See id. at 4631; I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) (2012). 
8.  I.R.C. § 167(h)(1). 
9. CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4633, 4642.  The IRS contended that CGGA should 
amortize its geophysical expenses under Section 167(g) rather than Section 167(h). Id. at 
4633; Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 
2 (July 21, 2016) (No. 25097-10).  Under the income forecast method in Section 167(g),
CGGA would compute its depreciation deduction by multiplying its capitalized geophysical 
expenses by the current year’s income arising from such expenses over the income anticipated 
as a result of the expenses through the tenth taxable year. See § 167(g); CGG Ams., 147 
T.C. No. 2, at 4633 n.8 (citing STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING
¶ 5.05[12][d][i], at 5-76 to -77 (2d ed. 1993)).
10.  Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76, 77. 
11. Robert A. Swiech, Geological and Geophysical Expenses for the Oil and Gas
Industry, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N, May 8, 2009, 2009 ABATAX-CLE 0508017 (Westlaw). 
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over which it could deduct expenses arising from its seismic data
acquisition and processing activities.12  Despite this, the Tax Court found 
for CGGA, holding that G&G expenses “are not confined to owners of mineral
interests” and that “the costs of the surveys borne by CGGA were incurred 
in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil and gas.”13 
CGG Americas marks a significant departure from past treatment of
G&G expenses, establishing a precedent for the expanded application of 
Section 167(h) to a novel body of taxpayers.  This Note analyzes the court’s 
decision to expand Section 167(h) to such entities as CGGA, drawing upon
cases, revenue rulings, and legislative history to discern the appropriateness
of the decision in light of relevant policy concerns.  Following this Introduction,
Section II of this Note sketches the historical framework of G&G expenses,
using historical cases and revenue rulings to illustrate the evolution of the
concept across much of the twentieth century and detailing the legislative 
history of the concept’s ultimate codification in Section 167(h) in 2005. 
Section III thereafter recounts the facts and analysis of the CGG Americas
opinion, noting strengths and weaknesses in the parties’ arguments amongst 
the backdrop of previously discussed historical points of reference. Section 
III also discusses the implications of the court’s approach in terms of its
potential future application.  Section IV concludes that while the approaches 
advanced by each party hold merit, the textualist approach to statutory
interpretation advanced by CGGA deviates from, or rather expands upon, 
the historical conceptualization of G&G expenses.  Furthermore, this Note
advocates an approach limiting the application of Section 167(h)(1) in the 
context of seismic data acquisition and processing, under which an entity
benefitting from economies of scale associated with the nonexclusive licensing
of data would be barred from applying Section 167(h) to expenses from 
those activities giving rise to the seismic data. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Cases, Revenue Rulings, and Field Memorandums 
Proper tax treatment of G&G expenses has been the subject of debate 
for nearly a century. Over this period, the IRS has altered its approach
numerous times.  Proponents of the oil and natural gas industry criticized
the results as inconsistent and problematic from an administrative, factual, 
and legal standpoint.14  From the industry’s perspective, G&G expenses 
12. CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4632–33. 
13. Id. at 4642. 
14. See Frank M. Burke, Jr., Current Expensing of Geological and Geophysical 
Costs: A Need for Legislative Clarification, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 778, 780 (1981) (“[T]he . . . 
history of the treatment of [G&G expenses] for federal income tax purposes illustrates the
180
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should, in theory, fall within the bounds of “ordinary and necessary business
expenses,” as current deductibility would provide “an incentive for the 
risks taken by the oil and gas industry.”15  Despite this, the Treasury and 
IRS have long considered G&G expenses to be capital in nature.16 
The lineage of cases requiring the capitalization of G&G expenses can
be traced as far back as 1928.  During this year, the Board of Tax Appeals
(BTA) issued two opinions requiring taxpayers to capitalize particular 
geological expenditures associated with the acquisition of oil and gas 
leasehold interests.17  Additional BTA opinions reinforced this capitalization 
requirement in ensuing years, albeit in the context of minerals.18  In 1941, 
however, the IRS retreated.  In a June 1941 General Counsel Memorandum
(GCM), the IRS took the position that G&G expenses “properly deductible
in computing net income” were “also deductible in computing net income 
from the property for the purpose of determining the net income limitation 
[IRS’s] inconsistent and confusing approach to the subject.”); George E. Ray & Oliver W.
Hammonds, The Treatment of Oil and Gas Exploration Costs for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes: Geological and Geophysical Expenditures, 28 TEX. L. REV. 910, 912 (1950) 
(“There are endless numbers of problems . . . to which no one in the industry or in the 
[IRS] knows the question, let alone the answer, and cannot possibly know until after many
years of practice with the new procedures . . . .”).
15. Burke, supra note 14, at 778. 
16. Id.; see also Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 5, CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2 (2016) (No. 25097-10) (“[F]ederal tax law precedent [has] 
guided the reporting of ‘[G&G] expenses’ for decades.”). 
17. See Nusbaum v. Comm’r, 10 B.T.A. 664, 665 (1928) (holding that amounts 
paid to a geologist for his investigation of the oil possibilities of a tract of land were capital 
expenditures (first citing Crompton Bldg. Corp. v. Comm’r, 2 B.T.A. 1056, 1056 (1925); 
then citing D. N. & E. Walter & Co. v. Comm’r, 4 B.T.A. 142, 142 (1926); and then citing
McCandless, 5 B.T.A. at 1114); Thompson v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1342, 1345 (1928) (holding 
that expenditures for surveys, geological opinions, settlement of suits involving title to lands,
abstracts of title, and legal opinions upon titles were capital expenditures (first citing McCandless 
v. Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 1114, 1114 (1927); and then citing Gopher Granite Co. v. Comm’r, 5
B.T.A. 1216, 1216 (1927)). 
18. See Rialto Mining Corp. v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 980, 986 (1932) (holding that 
“expenditures . . . made in connection with the survey and exploration of mining property
which the petitioner owned or expected to own” were capital expenditures (first citing 
Thompson, 9 B.T.A. at 1342; and then citing Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Comm’r, 16 B.T.A.
1135, 1135 (1929)); G.E. Cotton v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 866, 869 (1932) (holding that 
“expenditures made in prospecting [a] mineral lease . . . [were] capital expenditures [to be]
added to the cost of the mine when brought to production”); Parker Gravel Co. v. Comm’r,
21 B.T.A. 51, 61 (1930) (holding that an amount “paid for engineering services [to
ascertain] the extent and character of gravel deposits” was a capital expenditure).
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on percentage depletion.”19  Later that same year, in an October 1941 GCM,
the IRS further specified that “[d]eductible [G&G expenses] directly attributable 
to a specific interest or property” constituted deductions “for purposes of 
determining the net income limitation on the percentage depletion 
allowance.”20 
The taxpayer-favorable GCM was short-lived, however, as the Treasury
reinstated the G&G expense capitalization requirement with full force in 
1942 via the unpublished Field Procedure Memorandum 241.21 G&G 
expenses incurred in the acquisition of oil and gas leases were mandatorily
capitalized, as were expenses incurred in determinations concerning the
retention of existing leases.22  Unlike today, however, G&G expenses not 
resulting in the acquisition or retention of properties were allowed as ordinary 
and necessary current expenses.23 




In 1950, by way of Income Tax (IT) Office decision 4006, the IRS abolished 
expensing of G&G expenses as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses 
under Section 23(a)(1).24  This decision, however, did not preclude the current 
deductibility of certain G&G expenses, and the IT Office opted instead to 
alter the provision under which deductions would be proper.  Similar to 
Field Procedure Memorandum 241, IT 4006 permitted deductions of G&G 
19. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,689 (June 1941).  Under this GCM, G&G expenses 
not attributable to a particular producing property were allocated to “the several producing
properties.” Id.; see also Burke, supra note 14, at 781 (“This ruling generated a stir within
the oil and gas industry . . . .”). 
20. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,956 (Oct. 1941).  In contrast to the June GCM, under 
the October GCM, “[o]verhead or general items of deduction” (that is, nonspecific G&G 
expenses) were allocated to all properties. Id.
 21. See Ray & Hammonds, supra note 14, at 914 (“Then the Treasury, quietly and 
unannounced, startled the industry with the now famous Field Procedure Memorandum 
No. 241, issued by the Bureau to its field agents and engineers in 1942.”); see also
Schermerhorn Oil Corp. v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 151, 161‒62 (1942) (holding that 
contingent payments other than salary paid to a geologist for recommendations regarding 
acquisition of properties for oil development were capital expenditures).  In Schermerhorn
Oil, the BTA articulated a test for capital expenditures: “The test is whether the expenditures
are made in connection with the acquisition or preservation of a capital asset.  If so, they
are capital expenditures.”  Id. at 162. 
22. See Ray & Hammonds, supra note 14, at 914. 
23. See id.
24. I.T. 4006, 1950-1 C.B. 48, 48.  Reemphasizing the IRS’s general position in 
this decision, IT 4006 first provided that G&G expenses “constitute capital expenditures 
and are not deductible as business expenses.” Id. I.R.C. § 23(a)(1) (1940), mentioned above, 
is the predecessor to the current I.R.C. § 212(1) (2012).  I.R.C. § 212(1) (2012). 
182
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expenses not resulting in the acquisition or retention of properties, but as 
losses rather than as ordinary and necessary expenses.25 
Defining G&G expenses as “costs . . . incurred for the purpose of obtaining 
and accumulating data which will serve as a basis for the acquisition or 
retention of property,” IT 4006 clearly anticipated treatment—capitalization 
or deduction as a loss—turning on oil and gas interest acquisition or retention
determinations.26  If IT 4006 obtained interests on the basis of the G&G
expense-associated data, it would capitalize these costs “as part of the cost
of such property.”27  IT 4006 planned to allocate equally the costs of
reconnaissance-type surveys “to locate those portions of the project area 
which have the greatest promise” to such “areas of interest,” and the
decision would allocate further costs associated with each individual area
of interest only to the specific area from which the costs arose.28  Thus, IT
4006 capitalized costs of a detailed survey of an area of interest alongside 
the area’s allocable reconnaissance-survey costs if the area was acquired 
or retained as a result of data obtained through such surveys.29  Only in
cases in which either no areas of interest were identified or no properties
within or adjacent to areas of interests were acquired or retained could 
G&G expenses be deducted as current losses.30 
In 1977, the IRS reiterated IT 4006’s approach in Revenue Ruling 77­
188, updating its position only as it related to the definition of “property”
and the availability of the G&G expense treatment to “ore or mineral (other 
than oil or gas)” exploration expenditures.31  Over the ensuing three decades, 
25. See I.T. 4006, 1950-1 C.B. at 48. 
26. See id. at 49. 
27. Id.
28. Id.
 29. Id. at 50. 
30. See id. In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, the Court of 
Claims interpreted IT 4006 to permit current deduction of G&G expenses allocable to
portions of properties not actually leased (that is, portions, by acreage, for which lease 
options were released). 423 F.2d 277, 288 (Ct. Cl. 1970).  However, in Revenue Ruling 
77-187, the IRS declined to follow American Smelting, stating, “Deduction of a portion of
the exploration expenditures is not allowable as a result of acquiring or retaining only a
part of the properties explored by the taxpayer.”  Rev. Rul. 77-187, 1977-1 C.B. 50, 50. 
31. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76, 76–77.  In this Revenue Ruling, the IRS 
provided that in the context of G&G expenses, “property” is equivalent to the term as 
defined in Section 614.  Id. at 77.  Further, the IRS disallowed G&G expense treatment for 
ore or mineral exploration expenditures, specifying that such expenditures are only
deductible under Section 617.  Id. Though not a change per se, the IRS also removed the 
language relied on in American Smelting to justify loss treatment of G&G expenses 
allocable to portions of properties not ultimately retained. See id.; see also Am. Smelting, 
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this position remained largely unchanged; revenue rulings in this area amounted
to little more than additional guidance for application of the position to 
specific fact patterns.32  In Revenue Ruling 80-153, for example, the IRS 
specified that costs associated with test drilling on another taxpayer’s adjoining 
tract were capitalizable for the taxpayer-at-issue who contributed to the 
costs of drilling on this adjoining tract despite the fact that the well was 
nonproductive and thus ultimately plugged.33  Although the nonproductive 
well was not drilled on the taxpayer-at-issue’s land, the IRS required this 
taxpayer to capitalize the contribution, reasoning that the payment related
to the retention of property.34 
Further explaining the application of its position in Revenue Ruling 83­
105, the IRS provided seven factual situations, “illustrating, by example, 
how the various [G&G expenses] are to be allocated” and explaining “what 
constitutes an abandonment as a potential source of mineral production.”35 
This Revenue Ruling, which had the express purpose of amplifying of 
Revenue Ruling 77-188,36 aimed to provide comprehensive guidance to
taxpayers.  Yet inconsistencies in the IRS’s position still remained.37 
423 F.2d at 288 (quoting I.T. 4006, 1950-1 C.B. at 49); I.T. 4006, 1950-1 C.B. at 49;
Swiech, supra note 11 (“[T]he prior IT 4006 language quoted by the court in ASARCO 
‘costs of exploration attributable to that property should be capitalized’ was dropped.”). 
32. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-105, 1983-2 C.B. 51, 51 (“In addition to illustrating, by
example, how the various geological and geophysical costs are to be allocated, what constitutes 
an abandonment as a potential source of mineral production is explained.  Rev. Rul. 77­
188 amplified.”); Rev. Rul. 82-9, 1982-1 C.B. 39, 39 (“The taxpayer previously deducted 
the costs of obtaining the items as intangible drilling and development costs and has a zero
basis in them.  Therefore, the taxpayer’s charitable contribution deduction is zero.”); Rev.
Rul. 80-342, 1980-2 C.B. 99, 99 (“The drilling expenses are not intangible drilling 
and development costs subject to the elective provisions of sections 1.263(c)-1 and 1.612­
4(a) of the regulations; they are capital expenditures allocable to any leases that may be
acquired based on information obtained from the well.”); Rev. Rul. 80-153, 1980-1 C.B. 
10, 10 (“A ‘bottom hole’ contribution is includible in the recipient’s gross income and
must be treated as capital expenditure by the payor.”).
33.  Rev. Rul. 80-153, 1980-1 C.B. at 10‒11. 
34. Id.  During the same year, in Revenue Ruling 80-342, the IRS held that any
member of a consortium (composed of several oil companies) that successfully acquired
a lease “on the areas of interest to which the information obtained from [test] drilling”
applied must allocate its share of expenditures associated with test drilling to that lease. 
Rev. Rul. 80-342, 1980-2 C.B. at 101. 
35.  Rev. Rul. 83-105, 1983-2 C.B. at 51–55. 
36. Id. at 55 (“Rev. Rul. 77-188 is amplified.”). 
37. 	Swiech, supra note 11.  The following highlights one such inconsistency:
[I]n situations 5 and 6, a lease was retained although surveys showed no potential for
mineral production. However, the geological and geophysical costs were treated
inconsistently in the two situations.  The only apparent difference in the two situations 
was that the taxpayer in situation 5 expressed that his reason for retaining the
lease was for future exploration at greater depths and that no explanation for
retention of the lease was given in situation 6. Thus, it appears that when surveys 
184
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C. Section 167(h) Enacted and Revised 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a push to allow current expensing of G&G 
expenses resurfaced, evidenced by the introduction of numerous bills 
containing language to this effect.38  Years of failed attempts to abolish 
the IRS’s capitalization requirement through legislation ensued,39 but in 
indicate that a property is worthless, a taxpayer might be able to secure a loss 
deduction for the geological and geophysical costs by indicating that the lease is
being retained for further exploration at different depths, formations, or features than
previously surveyed. 
Id.; Rev. Rul. 83-105, 1983-2 C.B. at 54–55. 
38. See, e.g., Domestic Oil and Gas Preservation Act, S. 770, 105th Cong. § 2(a) 
(1997) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in
connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United
States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.”); National Energy
Security Act of 1997, H.R. 1648, 105th Cong. § 4(a) (1997) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to 
treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, 
or development of, oil or gas within the United States . . . as expenses which are not
chargeable to capital account.”); Domestic Oil and Gas Production and Preservation Act, 
S. 451, 104th Cong. § 121(a) (1995) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and
geophysical expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, 
oil or gas within the United States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital 
account.”); S. 34, 104th Cong. § 1(a) (1995) (“[T]he tax treatment which applies to the 
taxpayer’s intangible drilling and development costs shall also apply to . . . geological and 
geophysical costs for the purpose of ascertaining the existence, location, extent, or quality
of any deposit of oil or gas within the United States . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., S. 696, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2003) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat 
geological and geophysical expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or 
development of, oil or gas within the United States . . . as expenses which are not
chargeable to capital account.”); S. 1199, 107th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2001) (“[A] taxpayer
may elect to treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in connection with the 
exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United States . . . as expenses
which are not chargeable to capital account.”); Energy Tax Policy Act of 2001, H.R. 2511, 
107th Cong. § 304(a) (2001) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical 
expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas 
within the United States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.”);
National Energy Security Act of 2000, S. 2557, 106th Cong. § 803(a) (2000) (“[A] 
taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in connection
with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas as expenses which are not 
chargeable to capital account.”); Marginal Well Preservation Act of 2000, S. 2265, 106th 
Cong. § 3(b) (2000) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical expenses 
incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas as expenses 
which are not chargeable to capital account.”); Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 
106th Cong. § 1105(a) (1999) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical 
expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas 
within the United States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.”);
Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. REP. NO. 106-289, at 80 (1999) (Conf. 
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2005, the oil and gas industry’s position finally prevailed. During this year, 
the 109th Congress introduced two bills containing language providing a 
two-year amortization period for G&G expenses.40  The first of these bills, 
H.R. 1541, was approved and recommended by the House Ways and Means 
Committee but was never voted on by the House.41  The House opted instead
to pass the second, H.R. 6,42 before sending the bill to the Senate. 
The Senate passed H.R. 6, but only after removing the two-year G&G
expense amortization provision.43  The House disagreed with this amendment, 
but agreed to send the bill to a conference committee.44  This conference 
committee recommended a compromise proposal containing the two-year 
amortization provision.45  Although the conference committee’s explanatory 
statement contained no mention of particular provisions,46 Representative
William Thomas stated, “[T]hose who follow tax legislation can and should
use the Joint Committee on Taxation’s publication . . . as the functional
equivalent of a statement of managers for the purposes of completing their 
Rep.) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in
connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United
States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.”); United States Energy
Economic Growth Act, S. 325, 106th Cong. § 201(a) (1999) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to
treat geological and geophysical expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, 
or development of, oil or gas within the United States . . . as expenses which are not
chargeable to capital account.”); United States Energy Economic Growth Act, S. 1929, 
105th Cong. § 201(a) (1998) (“[A] taxpayer may elect to treat geological and geophysical 
expenses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas 
within the United States . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.”).
40.  Enhanced Energy Infrastructure and Technology Tax Policy Act of 2005, H.R.
1541, 109th Cong. § 205(a) (2005); Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1329(a)
(2005).  The first bill to contain language providing a two-year amortization period for 
G&G expenses, however, was introduced in 2003. See Energy Tax Policy Act of 2003, 
H.R. 1531, 108th Cong. § 304(a) (2003) (“Any geological and geophysical expenses paid 
or incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the 
United States . . . shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the 24-month period beginning
on the date that such expense was paid or incurred.”). 
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-45, at 34–35 (2005); CGG Ams., Inc. v. Comm’r, 147
T.C. No. 2, 4639 (July 21, 2016) (citing id. at 34).  In recommending H.R. 1541, the Committee 
reasoned that a two-year amortization period would “foster increased exploration for new
sources of supply” and provide “substantial simplification for taxpayers, significant gains 
in taxpayer compliance, and reductions in administrative cost.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-45, at 36. 
42. 151 CONG. REC. H2449–50 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2005) (House vote on H.R. 6). 
43.  151 CONG. REC. S7477 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (Senate vote on amended version
of H.R. 6).
 44. 151 CONG. REC. H5772 (daily ed. July 13, 2005) (“Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent to . . . disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the
Senate.”).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 109-190, at 433–34 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
46. See id. at 561–63; see also CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4640 (“[T]he statement 
did not discuss any particular provision of the compromise proposal.” (citing id.)). 
186
THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2017 11:54 AM     
 








   
  
  






   
     
     
  





     
 
    
  
  
   
[VOL. 54:  177, 2017] Ownership Not Required 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
understanding of what the tax incentives provide.”47  In this publication,
issued on the same day as Representative Thomas’s statement, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation described Revenue Ruling 77-188 in depth, first
noting, “IRS administrative rulings have provided further guidance regarding 
the definition and proper tax treatment of G&G costs.”48 
The House passed the compromise proposal also on the same day as 
Representative Thomas’s statement,49 and the Senate passed the proposal
only a single day after.50 Ten days after Senate approval, upon the President’s 
signing of the bill, the two-year amortization period for G&G expenses 
became law.51 With the exception of 2006 and 2007 amendments to lengthen 
the amortization period for “major integrated oil companies,”52 the G&G 
expense provision, Section 167(h), has remained intact since its enactment. 
III. CGG AMERICAS, INC. V. COMMISSIONER
A. Factual Background
The applicability of Section 167(h)(1) comprised the sole issue evaluated 
in CGG Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner.53  During the years in question, 
2006 and 2007, “CGGA’s activities . . . included the acquisition, processing, 
and imaging of data that it acquired in specific areas within the outer 
continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico.”54  As stipulated by the parties, these
marine seismic survey activities “constituted geophysical exploration for
47. 151 CONG. REC. H6953 (daily ed. July 28, 2005). 
48. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., JCX-60-05, DESCRIPTION AND
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT OF H.R. 6, TITLE XIII, THE
“ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES ACT OF 2005” 55–57 (Comm. Print 2005). 
49. See 151 CONG. REC. H6972–73 (daily ed. July 28, 2005). 
50. See 151 CONG. REC. S9374 (daily ed. July 29, 2005). 
51. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1329, 119 Stat. 594, 1020 
(2005) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 167(h) (2012)). 
52. See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109­
222, § 503, 120 Stat. 345, 354–55 (2006) (adding Section 167(h)(5), which directs major 
integrated oil companies to use a five-year amortization period for G&G expenses); Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 1502, 121 Stat. 1492, 
1800 (2007) (amending Section 167(h)(5) to lengthen major integrated oil companies’
G&G expense amortization period from five to seven years). 
53. 147 T.C. No. 2, 4631 (July 21, 2016) (“After concessions by the parties, the 
only issue remaining for decision is whether the expenses CGGA incurred to conduct certain 
marine surveys and to process data from the surveys are deductible under section 167(h).”). 
54.  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 3.
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oil and gas,” thus the nature of CGGA’s activities was not at issue.55 
Notwithstanding this stipulation, the IRS disputed CGGA’s application of 
Section 167(h)(1), asserting that the provision only applies to owners of
oil and gas interests, not to those in the business of licensing seismic data
to companies seeking to acquire oil and gas interests.56 
1. The Taxpayer’s Position 
CGGA premised its argument supporting its use of Section 167(h)(1) 
on a textualist reading of the provision.57  Indeed, CGGA stated, “It is
‘axiomatic that the starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language [of the statute] itself.’”58  Dispensing with the need 
for in-depth judicial inquiry, CGGA contended, “When the language of 
the statute ‘is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty
of interpretation does not arise and rules which are to aid doubtful meanings 
need no discussion.’”59  In CGGA’s view, the primacy of Section 167(h)(1)’s
plain language was manifest: 
[T]he phrase “[g]eophysical expenses paid or incurred in connection with the 
exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United States” plainly
includes expenses that were paid or incurred to conduct geophysical activities 
that captured or generated geophysical data and information used to search for or
detect oil or gas within the United States.60 
CGGA parsed Section 167(h)(1)’s language into independently definable
segments to expand on its plain language interpretation of the provision. 
Focusing on the “exploration for . . . oil and gas” language first, CGGA 
reasoned that since its activities comported with industry definitions of
both “exploration” and “geophysical exploration,” they necessarily constituted
 55. See id. at 6; CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4633 n.6 (“[E]ven though the IRS 
contends that the survey expenses are not ‘geological and geophysical expenses’, it does not
contest that the survey expenses related to ‘geophysical activities’. . . .”).
56. See CGG Ams., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4633; Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supra note 16, at 4 (“CGGA only supplies others who are in
the business of exploration for, and development of, oil and gas (commonly known as 
E&P companies) with data and information, gathered by its activities of conducting marine 
surveys and stored in its marine data library.”).
57. See Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 16, at 1–2 (“Rather than employing, or even considering, all of the statutory construction
tools, [CGGA] isolates each word of section 167(h) and assigns suitable definitions or 
meanings wherever they can be found, except in federal income tax authorities.”).
58. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)). 
59. Id. at 27 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). 
60. Id. at 30 (quoting I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) (2012)).  CGGA asserted, “The statutory language 
of section 167(h)(1) is plain and permits no more than one meaning.” Id. at 27. 
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the term “exploration” as used in Section 167(h)(1).61  Turning next to the
“in connection with” language of Section 167(h)(1), CGGA reasoned that 
because the Supreme Court has interpreted “in connection with” broadly,
Congress intended Section 167(h)(1) to have a similarly broad interpretation.62 
Accordingly, geophysical expenses with any logical relationship to exploration 
or development were necessarily incurred “in connection with the exploration 
for, or development of, oil or gas.”63 
2. The IRS’s Position 
In stark opposition to CGGA’s approach, the IRS relied on a historical
analysis of G&G expense treatment.64 To build the framework for its position 
against applying Section 167(h) to CGGA’s geophysical expenditures, the 
IRS emphasized the importance of congressional intent for enacting Section 
167(h), noting that a failure to consider established tax law precedent known 
to Congress at the time of Section 167(h)’s passage amounted to a distortion 
of congressional intent.65  Congress did not “writ[e] this new amortization 
statute on a blank slate.”66 
“[T]ax treatment of [G&G expenses] has always been associated with 
the activity of owning mineral interests,” the IRS maintained, thus it logically
 61. 	Id. at 37. 
The term ‘exploration’ is understood within the oil and gas industry to mean the 
commercial search for oil, gas, and sulphur, including geological and geophysical 
marine and airborne survey . . . .  ‘Geophysical exploration’ is understood within the
oil and gas industry to mean exploration that utilizes geophysical techniques . . . 
to produce data and information on oil, gas, and sulphur resources in support of
possible exploration and development activities.
Id. at 34–35. 
62. Id. at 39 (quoting Huntsman v. Comm’r, 905 F.2d 1182, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “in connection with” in the context 
of a tax provision (citing Snow v. Comm’r, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974))), rev’g 91 T.C. 917 
(1988)).
63. Id. at 40; I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) (2012). Omitted from the court’s opinion, CGGA also 
contended in brief that since its activities were regulated as G&G exploration activities under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012), they necessarily
“satisf[ied] the requirements of section 167(h)(1).”  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 9, at 51 (citing Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331– 
1356b (2012)). 
64. See Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
16, at 5.
 65. See id.
 66. Id.
 189
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follows that the same is true for the concept as codified in Section 167(h).67 
From the IRS’s perspective, given that CGGA did not incur its geophysical
expenses “to retain or acquire an oil or gas lease or to drill any oil or gas 
wells,” its expenditures were precluded from G&G expense treatment for 
tax purposes, rendering Section 167(h)(1) inapplicable.68  Expanding on
the precise intent underlying Section 167(h)’s passage, the IRS stated,
“Congress wanted to alleviate the complexity imposed by Rev[enue] Rul[ing]
77-188 on specific taxpayers involved in specific situations.”69  This, the
IRS claimed, is demonstrated by the fact that much of the “discussion in 
the Present Law section of the 2005 Committee Report was devoted exclusively
to an explanation of Rev[enue] Rul[ing] 77-188 and its application under 
Rev[enue] Rul[ing] 83-105.”70  Indeed, if “Congress wanted the taxpayers
working within those Rulings to have simplification, increased compliance 
and lower administrative costs,” then “applying the statute to situations that
were not previously subject to Rev[enue] Rul[ing] 77-188 would be 
‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafter.’”71 
B. Holding and Analysis 
Despite agreeing with the IRS that the legislative history of Section 
167(h) suggests a common nexus between G&G expenses as the term is
used in the statute and “similar phrases” in Revenue Rulings 77-188 and
83-105, the Tax Court held for CGGA.72  The court reasoned that irrespective
of this link, the rulings do not “define those terms as including only the costs 
of taxpayers owning mineral interests.”73  The court accepted that Congress
intended Section 167(h) to apply to parties acquiring or retaining oil and 
gas interests—owners of mineral interests; however, it did not view this 
as dispositive of “whether nonowners are governed by section 167(h).”74 
Although “Congress’s principal concern when it enacted section 167(h) may 
have been owners,” the court explained, “that does not mean that section 
167(h) covers owners and no other types of taxpayers.”75
 67. See id. at 8 (“It has always been associated with whether and when exploratory wells
are drilled or abandoned prior to development.”). 
68. See id.
 69. See id. at 17. 
70. Id.; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., JCX-60-05, supra note 48, 
at 55–57. 
71. Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 16, at
18 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
72.  CGG Ams., Inc. v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 2, 4640 (2016). 
73. Id.
 74. Id. at 4641. 
75. Id.
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The court further reasoned, “A law can achieve effects different than 
those that Congress principally intended to achieve in enacting the law.”76 
The court analogized to a Fifth Circuit case that permitted the FDA to
regulate pharmacy compounds as “new drugs” under the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 despite indications in the legislative history 
“that some supporters of the law—both in and out of Congress—intended 
that the law regulate the manufacturing of drugs by nonpharmacists.”77 
Like this Fifth Circuit case, the court opined that although the legislative 
history of Section 167(h) indicates that the statute’s supporters had mineral 
interest owners in mind, it does not “show they intended the provision’s
effect to be limited to mineral interest owners.”  In the court’s view, had
Congress intended such a limitation, “it could have enacted one.”78 
C. Implications: Appropriating Legislative Powers 
As the court demonstrated when it referred to the Fifth Circuit case, it 
is possible to find instances in which courts explicitly extend the boundaries 
of a statute beyond that which Congress contemplated.  Generally speaking, 
however, when an issue involving congressional intent arises in litigation, 
the court seeks to tailor application of the statute in question to comport
with rather than expand upon this intent.79  If that were not the case, the 
process of discerning congressional intent would be rendered meaningless.
Discerning congressional intent enables a court to delineate the appropriate
boundaries around a statute; accordingly, a court’s purposeful extension beyond 
such boundaries negates the necessity of determining how Congress anticipated 
the statute to apply.
As explained above, CGGA argued for a plain language reading of Section 
167(h), claiming the language of the statute admitted of only a single meaning.80
 76. Id.
 77. Id. (citing Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 397, 388 n.4, 406 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
78. Id. at 4641‒42 (“The absence of such a limitation, viewed in conjunction with 
the equivocal nature of the legislative materials, convinces us that [G&G expenses] are
not limited to taxpayers that own mineral interests.”).
79. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9 (1994) (“[T]he role of the courts 
is to fill in the gaps in legislation by interpreting the intentions of the law’s enacting
coalition.”).
80. See supra Section III.A.1.  In brief, CGGA stated, “The intent of Congress
is determined from the language of the statute itself, which is the most persuasive evidence
of the statute’s purpose.”  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
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On the basis of this claim, CGGA stated, “[I]f ‘the terms of a statute [are] 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’”81  The IRS, however, clearly 
articulated an ambiguity in the language of Section 167(h)(1).82  In response
to CGGA’s broad interpretation of Section 167(h)(1)’s “in connection 
with” language,83 the IRS explained that when “in connection with” is 
divorced from the tax meaning of G&G expenses, Section 167(h)(1) “becomes 
ambiguous,” rendering it “unclear whether the statute requires the expenses . . .
to be in connection with the taxpayer’s exploration, or in connection with 
anyone’s exploration for oil or gas.”84  In essence, CGGA asked the court 
to neglect possible alternative interpretations of Section 167(h)(1)’s terms, 
despite the IRS having demonstrated an ambiguity inherent in the terms 
of the statute. 
This language, “in connection with,” was arguably the most important 
language for purposes of CGGA’s case, as it is in that phrase that ambiguity 
regarding who was carrying out the exploration or development activities
arose.  By finding for the taxpayer on the ground that Section 167(h) did not 
explicitly limit its application to owners of oil and gas interests, the court 
neglected to consider this point of ambiguity, thereby implicitly accepting
CGGA’s plain language argument.  Perhaps if the court had relied less on 
the plain language of the statute itself, it would have afforded greater 
weight to the case law and legislative history, both of which plainly
demonstrate that only those taxpayers who acquire and retain oil and gas 
interests incur G&G expenses for purposes of Section 167(h)(1).85 
This case is problematic in terms of its implications.  At its core, it 
appropriates the power of the legislature by means of a spurious congressional
intent analysis rooted in a plain language reading of the statute. Other
courts employing a similar analysis would have little difficulty construing 
statutes to fit any number of things not explicitly limited by the language of
the statutes themselves.  Even in the face of compelling evidence—spanning 
9, at 53.  The cases CGGA cited to for this proposition, however, provide that the language 
of the statute is the starting place. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) 
(“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text . . . .”); 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of statutory
construction, our analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’” (quoting Estate of 
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992))). 
81. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 27 (first citing 
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); and then citing United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). 
82. See Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
16, at 10. 
83. See supra Section III.A.1.
84. Reply to Petitioners Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 16, at
10 (emphasis added). 
85. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.C.
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multiple decades—that a statute was only intended to apply to a given set
of things, courts could simply point to the lack of an explicit limitation to
justify an expansive plain language reading of the statute.  This blurs the 
separation of powers between government branches, albeit under the guise 
of furthering congressional intent. 
D. Comparison with Contextually Related Concepts 
1. Intangible Drilling Costs Under Section 263(c) 
G&G expenses exist on a spectrum—at one end of the spectrum are the
purely exploratory G&G expenses like those incurred by CGGA; at the 
other end are those incurred solely during development.  The latter end of 
this spectrum includes expenses “incident to and necessary for the drilling 
of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas,” meaning 
that it spills into, or overlaps with, the adjacent concept of Intangible Drilling 
and Development Costs (IDC).86  Thus, where G&G expenses fall on the
exploration-to-development spectrum can determine whether they are treated 
as G&G expenses or IDC for tax purposes.87 
Section 263(c) directs the U.S. Treasury to prescribe regulations “grant[ing]
the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and development costs 
in the case of oil and gas wells.”88  Treasury Regulations Section 1.612­
4(a) thus provides: 
In accordance with the provisions of section 263(c), intangible drilling and
development costs incurred by an operator (one who holds a working or operating 
interest in any tract or parcel of land either as a fee owner or under a lease or any
other form of contract granting working or operating rights) in the development 
of oil and gas properties may at his option be chargeable to capital or to expense.89 
In the context of the interplay between IDC and G&G expenses, we can
derive two alternative conclusions from the IDC ownership requirement.
The first supports application of a similar ownership requirement for G&G 
expenses, given that circumstances exist in which G&G expenses constitute 
IDC—because IDCs overlap with a portion of the G&G expense spectrum.
 86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965). 
87. The IRS states, “Often, taxpayers will deduct an entire G&G survey as IDC when 
only a small portion relates to a specific well location.” IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, 
§ 4.41.1.2.2.3.2 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-041-001.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VT5L-KGEM].
88.  I.R.C. § 263(c) (2012). 
89.  Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a). 
 193
















   
 










   
The second supports the notion that Congress purposefully excluded any
similar ownership requirement for G&G expenses.  Without mentioning the
IDC ownership requirement, the Tax Court endorsed the second of these 
alternatives.  To the court, had Congress anticipated ownership limitations in
the context of G&G expenses, Section 167(h)(1) would have included language 
similar to that found in Treasury Regulations Section 1.612-4(a).  Note, 
however, that the ownership requirement in Treasury Regulations 1.612­
4(a) was not of Congress’s making.90 
2. Qualifying Income Under Section 7704(d)(1)(E)
Though less related to G&G expenses than the concept of IDC, it is 
worth noting that the approach the court took in CGG Americas mirrors 
that taken by the Treasury in the context of the natural resources exception 
in Section 7704(d)(1)(E). The natural resources exception excludes from 
corporate—entity-level—taxation any publicly traded partnership with
sufficient qualifying income “derived from” natural resource-related
activities.91  In May 2015, the Treasury issued proposed regulations that
aimed to clarify the types of activities from which a publicly traded
partnership can derive qualifying income.92  Finalized in January 2017,
Treasury Regulations Section 1.7704-4 codified years of expansive Private 
Letter Rulings concerning the natural resource exception, officially extending 
the exception to support entities that never gain possession of the natural 
resource.93 
In much the same way that Regulations Section 1.7704-4 extended
qualifying income to auxiliary entities providing support to entities actually
engaged in oil and gas production, the tax court in CGG Americas extended 
G&G expenses to an entity providing support to entities actually engaged 
in oil and gas exploration.  In both cases, taxpayers whom Congress did not 
anticipate received favorable treatment through post-enactment extensions of
the respective statutes.
 90. See Tax Code, Regulations, and Official Guidance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/tax-code-regulations-and-official-guidance [https://perma. 
cc/XX92-9QMR] (last updated Jan. 11, 2017) (“Treasury regulations . . . pick up where 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) leaves off by providing the official interpretation of the 
IRC by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.”).
91.  I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) (2012). 
92.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-4, 80 Fed. Reg. 25970, 25970‒71 (May 6, 2015). 
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-4 (2017); see generally Kristofer A. Thompson, Special
Report, Refining ‘Qualifying Income’ for Natural Resource Activities, 152 TAX NOTES 701 
(2016) (analyzing proposed regulations treating hydraulic fracturing support services as 
qualifying income). 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The language of Section 167(h)(1) plainly encompasses the activities 
undertaken by CGGA when read in complete isolation.  In the context of 
historical materials, however, it becomes clear that the issue of Section 
167(h)(1)’s application is more multifaceted than the provision’s words 
alone portray.94  From the earliest cases involving G&G expenses through 
the codification of the concept in Section 167(h), G&G expenses were
exclusively associated with owners of oil and gas interests.  At no point 
have parties lacking the intent to acquire or retain oil or gas interests engaged 
in activities giving rise to G&G expenses.
Whether this history should play a role in determining if Section 167(h)(1) 
applies to CGGA turns on whether Section 167(h)(1)’s language permits 
only a single interpretation, as any ambiguity in the provision’s language 
justifies reliance on historical materials.95  Given the ambiguity inherent
to Section 167(h)(1)’s “in connection with” language, the court erred in relying 
on the provision’s language to the exclusion of its historical materials.96 
Had the court given greater weight to historical materials, it could have 
established a rule on the basis of a point noted in brief by CGGA.  In brief,
CGGA stated, “The non-exclusive licensing model employed by CGGA 
and its competitors took advantage of economies of scale by spreading the
costs of data acquisition and processing over time and among multiple 
customers who desired to make use of the data.”97  Interestingly, this point
by CGGA highlights a component absent from the history of G&G expenses: 
economies of scale.  At no point in the historical materials do the parties 
involved incur G&G expenses with the intention of taking advantage of
economies of scale.  Accordingly, in the context of seismic data acquisition 
and processing, the court could have created a rule under which an entity
benefitting from economies of scale associated with the non-exclusive 
licensing of seismic data would be barred from applying Section 167(h)(1)
to expenses from those activities giving rise to the seismic data.
Limiting the application of Section 167(h)(1) to entities incurring G&G 
expenses to acquire or retain oil or gas interests—to the exclusion of entities
benefiting from economies of scale associated with G&G activities—is
not only consistent with the history of G&G expenses, it is also sound as
 94. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
 95. See discussion supra Section III.A.2. 
96. See discussion supra Sections III.B, III.C.
97.  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 41. 
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a policy matter.  CGGA and its competitors profit directly from their G&G 
activities, as they engage in these activities for the sole purpose of licensing 
the products of their labor, namely seismic data, to entities seeking to acquire
or retain oil or gas interests.98  This licensing creates additional value,
realized as profit, that would not be present were the interest owning customers
to incur G&G expenses on their own behalf. 
Allowing CGGA to benefit from both economies of scale—associated 
with its seismic data licensing—and the accelerated amortization available 
under Section 167(h)(1) creates an imbalance in the incentive scheme at 
the heart of Section 167(h).  CGGA derives profit from its G&G activities 
without the need to actually acquire and retain oil or gas interests; it has 
no need to actually drill for and extract oil or gas to reap the benefits of its 
labor. Although “CGGA and its competitors took on a significant portion
of the up-front cost of generating geophysical data and information and 
the associated risk,” effectively “reduc[ing] the risks borne by CGGA’s
customers as part of the exploration process,”99 the fact that Section 167(h)(4) 
anticipates the possibility of an oil or gas interest’s abandonment during 
Section 167(h)(1)’s two-year amortization period demonstrates that Congress
did not contemplate that risk-shifting when enacting Section 167(h).100 
Overly expansive interpretations like the one advanced by CGGA set
precarious precedent for the Tax Court. By adopting CGGA’s approach,
the court fundamentally altered the nature of Section 167(h)(1), thereby
permitting its application to a new body of taxpayers.  Under the court’s 
reasoning, any lack of explicit limiting language can potentially suffice to
extend a statute’s application.101  Congress holds the power to enact legislation, 
thus the expansion or restriction of statutes’ applications should be left to
the legislative branch.  When the judiciary appropriates the power to expand
beyond what Congress contemplated, it diminishes the separation of powers.
In sum, if taxpayers like CGGA wish to rewrite statutory language to fulfill 
their tax-planning goals, they should seek legislative change rather than 
asking a court to reach beyond the limits of its power. 
98.  CGG Ams., Inc. v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 2, 4632 (July 21, 2016). 
99.  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 58. 
100. See I.R.C. § 167(h)(4) (2012) (“If any property with respect to which geological 
and geophysical expenses are paid or incurred is retired or abandoned during the 24-month
period . . . no deduction shall be allowed . . . and the amortization deduction . . . shall 
continue with respect to such payment.”).
101. The court endorsed a broad and flexible reading of the Code’s language.  See
CGG Ams., Inc., 147 T.C. No. 2, at 4641 (“A law can achieve effects different than those
that Congress principally intended to achieve in enacting the law.”). 
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